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NeuroethicsIn recent years, a number of new neuroimaging techniques have detected covert awareness in some patients
previously thought to be in a vegetative state/unresponsive wakefulness syndrome. This raises worries for pa-
tients, families, and physicians, as it indicates that the existing diagnostic error rate in this patient group is higher
than assumed. Recent research on a subset of these techniques, called active paradigms, suggests that false pos-
itive and false negative findingsmay result from applying different statistical methods to patient data. Due to the
nature of this research, these errorsmay be unavoidable, andmay draw into question the use of active paradigms
in the clinical setting. We argue that false positive and false negative findings carry particular moral risks, which
may bear on investigators3 decisions to use certain methods when independent means for estimating their
clinical utility are absent. We review and critically analyze this methodological problem as it relates to both
fMRI and EEG active paradigms. We conclude by drawing attention to three common clinical scenarios where
the risk of diagnostic error may be most pronounced in this patient group.
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
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. This is an open access article under1. Introduction
Recent research suggests that functional magnetic resonance
imaging (fMRI) and electroencephalography (EEG) offer diagnostic
information ancillary to standard clinical examinations of seriously
brain-injured patients. A subset of these techniques, called activethe CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
589A. Peterson et al. / NeuroImage: Clinical 7 (2015) 588–597paradigms (Laureys and Schiff, 2012), utilizes a volitional mental
task, such as mental imagery or selective attention, as a proxy for be-
havioral response to commands. Using these methods, investigators
have revealed residual covert awareness in some patients once
thought to be in a vegetative state— also referred to as unresponsive
wakefulness syndrome (VS/UWS) (Laureys et al., 2010). Given the
success of these techniques, clinical application may improve diag-
nostic accuracy (Giacino et al., 2014; Laureys et al., 2004; Owen,
2013). However, integrating active paradigms into the standard di-
agnostic protocol poses several difficult questions regarding clinical
utility.
Neuroimaging and EEG assessment of brain injury requires
powerful statistical tools for data analysis. Whether group-
averaged brain activity is tested for statistical significance, individ-
ual subject neural anatomy is adapted to standard cortical maps, or
regression filters are used to eliminate artifacts, statistical model-
ing is an invaluable tool for identifying statistically significant find-
ings. However, which statistical methods ought to be used may
remain unclear as the majority of techniques used to assess seri-
ously brain-injured patients have not yet been model-tested nor
extensively tested against one another (but see Stender et al.,
2014).
Given this methodological difficulty, it is possible for different
methods to produce conflicting results. Some results may be so
heterogeneous that they engender empirically equivalent, yet mutually
inconsistent, diagnoses. For example, when working from an identical
data set, one task design or method of analysis may detect the presence
of awareness in patients previously thought to be in a VS/UWS (Cruse
et al., 2011), while another may fail to identify any statistically signifi-
cant findings (Goldfine et al., 2013). Which results reflect the truth
(i.e. whether a patient is aware or not) may remain an open question,
as independent confirmation may be technically difficult or precluded
on theoretical grounds.
In other domains of medicine, information garnered from clinical
assessment may be corroborated with pathophysiological examina-
tion. Ideally, multiple sources of diagnostic information converge to
form a conciliatory picture of the patient3s condition. If diagnostic in-
formation is inconsistent, physicians have recourse to further tests
that assess the truth of the patient3s complaint. Diagnosis after seri-
ous brain injury with the aid of active paradigms presents a more
complicated puzzle. Because the only accepted clinical procedure
for assessing seriously brain-injured patients requires behavioral
participation – either through self-report, command following, or func-
tional object use (cf. Giacino et al., 2004) – confirming active paradigm
findings by appealing to patients who are already known to be behav-
iorally unresponsive is problematic. This problem may be resolved by
comparing results to other well-established prognostic and diagnostic
evidence (Giacino et al., 2014; Young, 2009a). However, as previous re-
search has demonstrated (e.g. Owen et al., 2006; Monti et al., 2010;
Cruse et al., 2011; Naci and Owen, 2013; Fernández-Espejo and Owen,
2013; Gibson et al., 2014; Monti et al., 2015), some patients may satisfy
all clinical criteria for the VS/UWS while consistently demonstrating
awareness through active paradigms. Such patients deviate from
standard diagnostic categories (Bruno et al., 2011) and challenge as-
sumptions regarding the attribution of consciousness when conven-
tional evidence is absent (Bayne and Hohwy, 2014; Shea and Bayne,
2010).
Given these methodological obstacles, how can investigators
determinewhichmethods ought to be used? Surely the relative accura-
cy of active paradigms may be determined as this research matures.
Promisingwork on intrinsic cortical networks and their role inmodulat-
ing consciousness (Demertzi et al., 2014, 2013a; Fernández-Espejo et al.,
2012; Soddu et al., 2012; Vanhaudenhuyse et al., 2011, 2010, 2009)may
provide a standard experimental benchmark, or gold standard, to vali-
date new methods in the future. However, because this benchmark
has not yet been established, investigators may appeal to a differentrationale when attempting to identify which methods are most appro-
priate for clinical practice.
While remaining agnostic to the superiority of any method, we
aim to make explicit the normative rationale for utilizing a partic-
ular fMRI or EEG active paradigm over others in the absence of a
precise estimation of clinical utility. This, we argue, may be an ef-
fort to strike a balance between false positive and false negative
diagnostic errors. Both false positive and false negative diagnoses
in this patient group may have important implications for medi-
cal decision-making. These implications may include end-of-life
issues (Demertzi et al., 2011), pain management (Boly et al.,
2008; Demertzi et al., 2013b, 2009; Laureys et al., 2002;
McQuillen et al., 1991; Schnakers and Zasler, 2007), and the con-
cerns of family members (Graham et al., 2014; Jox et al., 2012;
Kitzinger and Kitzinger, 2013; Kuehlmeyer et al., 2012). While
problems of diagnostic error extend to all neuroimaging methods,
we focus our discussion on fMRI and EEG active paradigms that
are a source of current disagreement in the disorders of con-
sciousness literature.2. Assessing consciousness after serious brain injury
Consciousness, as defined in clinical neurology, consists of two
components: wakefulness and awareness (Giacino et al., 2014;
Laureys et al., 2004; Multi-society task force on PVS, 1994; Plum
and Posner, 1982; Jennet and Plum, 1972). Wakefulness is demon-
strated by behavioral or electrophysiological manifestations of
arousal, while awareness is demonstrated by sustained, reproduc-
ible, voluntary behavior, or evidence of language comprehension
and expression (Giacino et al., 2004, 2002; Multi-Society task force
on PVS, 1994). For any given healthy conscious individual, wakeful-
ness is often, if not always, accompanied by awareness.
Following a period of coma, some seriously brain injured pa-
tients may emerge into a VS/UWS or minimally consciousness
state (Giacino et al., 2002; Jennet and Plum, 1972; Plum and
Posner, 1982). Individuals diagnosed as VS/UWS exhibit semi-
regular circadian rhythms, yet evidence no concomitant awareness
of visual, auditory, tactile or noxious stimuli (Multi-society task
force on PVS, 1994). The VS/UWS is therefore referred to as, “wake-
ful unresponsiveness” (Jennet and Plum, 1972). By contrast, mini-
mally conscious patients demonstrate regular circadian rhythms
with intermittent but reproducible evidence of awareness
(Giacino et al., 2002). The fine-grained sub-categorizations of min-
imally conscious state+ and minimally conscious state− have re-
cently been introduced to parse out differences in the complexity of
functional recovery (Bruno et al., 2013). Minimally conscious+ patients
demonstrate higher-order behavioral responses, such as command fol-
lowing or intelligible verbalization, while minimally conscious− pa-
tients exhibit lower order responses, such as visual pursuit,
localization to noxious stimuli, or stimulus-driven cognition
(Demertzi and Laureys, 2014). All such conditions are generally referred
to as disorders of consciousness (DoC).
Current methods for diagnosing seriously brain-injured patients
utilize a combination of clinical assessment, patient history, struc-
tural MRI, and resting state EEG. The primary diagnostic instrument,
the clinical examination, probes a patient3s preserved awareness
through behavior. According to validated behavioral scales, visual
fixation, command following, functional object use, localization to
noxious stimuli, intelligible verbalization, or intentional communi-
cation are evidence of awareness (Shiel et al., 2010) (Giacino et al.,
2004; Multi-society task force, 1994; Teasdale and Jennet, 1974). If
a patient demonstrates any number of these behaviors in a predict-
able and task appropriate manner, it is inferred that the patient is,
at least minimally, conscious (See Seel et al., 2010 for an extensive
review).
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diagnosis of seriously brain-injured patients (Giacino et al., 2014),
results may conflict due to variations in scale application or the subjec-
tive interpretation of examination findings. Studies investigating the
accuracy of these scales consistently suggest that 30–40% of VS/UWSpa-
tientsmaybe clinicallymisdiagnosed (Andrews et al., 1996; Childs et al.,
1993; Schnackers et al., 2009). Moreover, in a recent cohort study
assessing diagnostic accuracy in seriously brain-injured patients, it
was demonstrated that levels of awareness fluctuate over a 6.5-hour
time interval (Candilieri et al., 2011). Taken together, these findings
suggest that variability in the interpretation of examination findings,
as well as the unique clinical presentation of each patient, may hinder
diagnostic accuracy. The potential for misdiagnosis that follows raises
serious ethical concerns. Indeed, misdiagnosis may have profound
implications for medical management, the well being of patients3 fami-
lies, and end-of-life decisions (Fins, 2003).
After accounting for the proportion of patients misdiagnosed as
VS/UWS due to clinical errors, there still remain patients who retain
residual preserved awareness despite appearing to be entirely be-
haviorally unresponsive at the bedside. These patients, while unable
to demonstrate overt evidence of awareness, may nevertheless be
capable of covert command following with the aid of fMRI or EEG.
The fMRI mental imagery task developed by Owen and colleagues
was the first to identify a VS/UWS patient who retained covert
awareness (Owen et al., 2006). In this study, a 23-year old patient,
who had been clinically diagnosed as VS/UWS, was instructed to
imagine two activities – playing tennis and moving from room to
room in her house –while fMRI recorded her brain activity. Previous
fMRI research on healthy participants demonstrated that willfully
imagining these activities produced unique hemodynamic changes
in the supplementary motor area and parahippocampal gyrus, re-
spectively (Boly et al., 2007). Based on these findings, investigators
were able to decode which activity the patient was imagining from
the imaging evidence alone. When compared to healthy participants,
the patient3s neural response was statistically indistinguishable.
Neural activation was robust, reproducible, task-appropriate, and
sustained for precise 30-second intervals, thus precluding the possi-
bility of an automatic, stimulus driven response to verbal cues
(Nachev and Husain, 2007; Owen et al., 2007). In 2010, this technique
was applied in a heterogeneous sample of clinically diagnosed VS/
UWS and minimally conscious patients (Monti et al., 2010). Of those
in the VS/UWS subgroup, four (17%) willfully modulated their brain
activity to commands.Table 1
Examples of fMRI active paradigms.
Study Participants Task
Owen et al. (2006) 1 DoC patient (VS/UWS = 1) Mental image
Boly et al. (2007) 34 healthy participants Mental image
Monti et al. (2010) 54 DoC patients (VS/UWS = 23;
MCS = 31)
Mental image





Monti et al. (2013) 1 DoC patient (MCS = 1) 21 healthy
participants
Selectively at
Naci et al. (2013) 15 healthy participants Selectively at
Fernández-Espejo and Owen
(2013)
1 DoC patient (VS/UWS = 1) Mental imag
Naci and Owen (2013) 3 DoC patients
(VS/UWS = 1; MCS = 2)
Selectively at
Vegetative State/Unresponsive Wakefulness Syndrome = VS/UWS; Minimally Conscious StateThe application of fMRI active paradigms has been highly effective
for identifying covert awareness in some behaviorally unresponsive pa-
tients. It has also generated a significant body of work that applies the
principles of command following to fMRI in a variety of ways (see
Table 1). Despite this success, fMRI poses several technical limitations
that may prevent widespread use in clinical practice. fMRI is expensive,
requires patients to be transported to the imaging unit, and may be in-
appropriate for patients who are critically ill, are unable to remain mo-
tionless in the scanner, or have metallic implants. In light of these
obstacles, investigators have turned toward portable, noninvasive EEG
techniques to assess residual awareness in seriously brain-injured pa-
tients (see Table 2). Like fMRI active paradigms, these methods investi-
gate whether participants can covertly modulate their brain activity.
These studies primarily assess power and wave frequency oscillations
in a participant3s cortex. Using these methods, investigators have dem-
onstrated, among other findings, the utility of power spectral analysis in
detecting covert motor imagery (Goldfine et al., 2011), the detection of
covert command following in several patients clinically diagnosed as
VS/UWS (Cruse et al., 2011, 2012a), and a significant link between the
probability of residual cognition and patient etiology (non-traumatic
versus traumatic brain injury) (Cruse et al., 2012b).
Clearly, there is a breadth of research strategies for assessing the
presence of covert awareness in seriously brain-injured patients with
active paradigms. These strategies are driven by the common goal of ac-
curately tracking the presence and recovery of consciousness. Investiga-
tors may attempt to estimate the accuracy of these methods, or their
clinical utility, in order to identify which is most appropriate for clinical
practice. However, this may prove difficult for both practical and princi-
pled reasons. This problemmay be clarified by laying out the challenges
that arise when attempting to estimate clinical utility for both fMRI and
EEG active paradigms.
3. Estimating clinical utility
An estimation of a test3s diagnostic accuracy – its clinical utility – is
derived from calculating its sensitivity and specificity. Sensitivity and
specificity are best understood through a four-by-four matrix, which
represents the convergence or divergence of the test results and the
true state-of-affairs (see Table 3). A true positive is an instance of the re-
sults correspondingwith the state-of-affairs. Thismay be evidence of an
effect when the target phenomenon is, in fact, present in the test condi-
tions. Similarly, a true negative may be no record of an effect because
the target phenomenon is absent from the test conditions. In eitherRelevant finding(s)
ry (tennis vs. spatial navigation) Neural modulation in DoC patient to
commands
ry (tennis vs. spatial navigation) Neural modulation in healthy participants
to commands
ry (tennis vs. spatial navigation) Neural modulation in DoC patients
to commands
ry (varying motor tasks: tennis;
able tennis; racket ball; pushing legs;
rate; basketball; rock climbing)
Neural modulation in healthy
participants and
DoC patients to commands
tending to visual stimulus Evidence of selective attention to visual
stimulus in DoC patient to command
tending to auditory stimulus Evidence of selective attention to
auditory stimulus in healthy
participants to command
ery (tennis vs. spatial navigation) Evidence of neural modulation in
DoC patient to command
tending to auditory stimulus Evidence of selective attention to auditory
stimulus in DoC patients to command
= MCS; Locked in Syndrome = LIS; Disorders of Consciousness = DoC.
Table 2
Examples of EEG active paradigms.
Study Participants Task Relevant finding(s)
Goldfine et al. (2011) 3 DoC patients (1 = LIS; 2 = MCS)
5 healthy participants
Mental imagery (swimming vs.
spatial navigation)
Mental imagery in healthy participants
and some DoC patients to command;
Differing spectral changes in DoC patients
relative to healthy participants
Cruse et al. (2011) 16 DoC patients (VS/UWS = 16)
12 healthy participants
Motor imagery (clenching fist vs.
wiggling toes)
Motor imagery in DoC patients and healthy
participants to command




Motor imagery in DoC and healthy
participants to command
Cruse et al. (2012b) 23 DoC patients (MCS = 23) Motor imagery
(clenching fist vs. wiggling toes)
Motor imagery to command in patients
with traumatic etiologies
Lulé et al. (2013) 18 DoC patients (LIS = 2; MCS = 13;
VS/UWS = 3)
16 healthy participants
Auditory oddball task Evidence of command following in some
healthy participants and DoC patients
Electroencephalography = EEG; Vegetative State/Unresponsive Wakefulness Syndrome = VS/UWS; Minimally Conscious State = MCS; Locked in Syndrome = LIS; Disorders of Con-
sciousness = DoC.
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most reliably produces true positives and true negatives is considered a
gold standard.
False positives and false negatives – known as type I and type II
errors – are categorically different. These findings represent a
divergence in the test results and the true state-of-affairs. A false
positive occurs when evidence of an effect is measured, yet the
target phenomenon is absent from the test conditions. Conversely,
a false negative occurs when an effect is not measured even though
the target phenomenon is, in fact, present in the test conditions (see
Table 3).
The rate of false positives and false negatives bears directly on the
estimation of sensitivity and specificity of a diagnostic test (see
Table 3). A test is 100% sensitive if it detects every instance of a target
phenomenon, even at the expense of returning false positive results.
As false negatives increase, sensitivity is reduced. This relationship is
expressed formally as: [n(true positives) / (n(true positives) + n(false
negatives)].
Specificity, on the other hand, is a function of a test3s ability to
uniquely detect a target phenomenon. A test is 100% specific if it
accurately discriminates between true positives and false positives.
While a highly specific diagnostic test effectively shields out false posi-
tives, increases in discriminatory standards may also inadvertently ex-
clude true findings. A false negative may result. This relationship is
expressed formally as: [n(true negatives) / (n(true negatives) + n(false
positives)].
There is a natural difficulty in estimating the sensitivity and specific-
ity of imaging techniques designed to detect residual awareness in
brain-injured patients. This is primarily due to the lack of independent
methods for checking the correspondence of test results with the true
state-of-affairs. To determine if a positive or negative result is, in fact,
true or false, one requires a veridical benchmark of the state-of-affairs,
or gold standard, for comparison. However, since the only knownmeth-
od for assessing residual awareness in seriously brain-injured patients
appeals to behavior, information derived from patients already known
to be behaviorally unresponsive cannot serve this function. Without
this benchmark, it may remain unclear whether imaging findings are
accurate, even if they fit with the overall clinical profile of the patient.Table 3
Standard formulae for estimating clinical utility.
Test outcome Experimental target present
Test effect measured True positive
Test effect not measured False negative
Estimation of clinical utility Sensitivity = [n(true positives) / (n(true po
(false negative)]This problemhas direct implications for the calculation of clinical utility.
If there are no independent methods for confirmation, an accurate cal-
culation of sensitivity and specificity may be difficult or impossible to
determine.
3.1. Sensitivity
One way to address this problem with respect to sensitivity may be
to compare imaging findings in patients to the performance of healthy
participants under identical experimental conditions. Because healthy
participants are known to be conscious, it stands to reason that a tech-
nique capable of reliably producing true positives in a control popula-
tion will likely produce true positives in the clinical population.
Moreover, ensuring the reliability of effects at the single-subject level
in healthy participants is an important criterion for successful applica-
tion of any method used on individual patients. In a control study
used to validate the widely deployed fMRI mental imagery task, Boly
and colleagues demonstrated that the technique was sensitive in 100%
of individual healthy participants (Boly et al., 2007). Group level identi-
fication and localization of canonical regions of interest were used in
classification models tailored for analysis at the single-subject level.
Moreover, the task design – mental imagery for discrete 30-second in-
tervals – combined with instructions to up-regulate specific brain re-
gions, leaves little doubt that the measured effect is the result of
willed neural modulation (Fernández-Espejo and Owen, 2013; Owen
et al., 2007; Owen, 2013).
Despite the high-level accuracies reported in some control studies of
active paradigms, others have drawn into question the single-subject
level sensitivity of both fMRI and EEG (Giacino et al., 2014). For exam-
ple, in the seminal fMRI study by Monti and colleagues, only 1 of 31 pa-
tients clinically diagnosed asminimally consciouswas able to command
follow through mental imagery (Monti et al., 2010). One may presume
that this is a clear evidence of false negatives. After all, if a patient can
follow commands behaviorally, then intuitively she should also be
able to command follow through mental imagery. However, it is also
possible that in some patients, deficits in language comprehension,
decision-making, working memory or executive function may yield
brain activity too weak to interpret or to engage in the experimentalExperimental target absent
False positive
True negative
sitives) + Specificity = [n(true negatives) / (n(true negatives) +
(false positives)]
592 A. Peterson et al. / NeuroImage: Clinical 7 (2015) 588–597task (Naci et al., 2012). This suggests that, whilefindings in patientsmay
appear to be false negatives, there is no way to independently confirm
whether this is a failure of the imaging technique, or a confound inher-
ent to patient response. Alternative explanatory models, such as a diag-
nostic taxonomy that distinguishes minimally conscious+ from
minimally conscious− patients (Bruno et al., 2012), may account for
these findings.
Notwithstanding the challenge of accurately identifying false
negatives in patients, several studies testing EEG active paradigms
in healthy participants have also returned sensitivity rates of less
than 100%. In the most extensive EEG active paradigm study to
date, Guger and colleagues (2003) detected volitional motor imag-
ery with classification accuracies greater than 70% in roughly 50%
of healthy participants. The EEG technique developed by Cruse and
colleagues only detected willed cortical oscillations in 75% of healthy
participants (Cruse et al., 2011), and Lulé and colleagues3 recent EEG
study produced variable results in a similar control group (Lulé et al.,
2013). These findings highlight that false negatives remain a serious
methodological challenge for investigators seeking to develop EEG
active paradigms.
To be sure, these studies have demonstrated statistically significant
findings in the majority of participants, and have laid a conceptual
groundwork to develop more effective methods. In the case of healthy
participant studies, investigators have recourse to independently
check results by conducting post-scan interviews. However, in behav-
iorally unresponsive patients this is not possible. In either case, though,
what these findings do suggest is that there is no prima facie guarantee
that any active paradigm will detect awareness in 100% of participants
known to be conscious a priori. The risk of false negatives that follows
must be taken into consideration as investigators interpret the findings
of future studies.3.2. Specificity
Ideally, diagnostic tests should not produce false positives. However,
it is standard to presume that a small proportion of positive results may
occur by chance. The well-known demonstration of phantom hemody-
namic activity in a deceased salmon (Bennett et al., 2010), or EEG
recordings fromwatermelon (Schafer et al., 2011), remind us that back-
ground noise may appear as positive results without proper statistical
precautions. It is therefore a common practice to assess neuroimaging
and EEG findings against statistical thresholds of varying degrees of
conservativeness.
The statistical threshold for any given neuroimaging or EEG experi-
ment determines the level of evidence necessary for rejecting the null-
hypothesis. A standard threshold in neuroimaging and EEG research is
derived from the assumption that 5% of results will be false positives.
From this assumption the common statistical threshold, p b 0.05, is de-
termined. The confidence level of each independent test, or p-value, is
compared to this statistical threshold. If a test result3s p-value is greater
than the statistical threshold, it is assumed that the result may be due to
chance.
In any neuroimaging or EEG experiment, it is often necessary to per-
form multiple independent tests — whether from individual partici-
pants, individual trials, individual fMRI voxels, or individual EEG
recording sites. As independent tests grow, comparisons between
tests also increase. These comparisons precipitate a greater probability
of false positives occurring by chance. This problem may be further
compounded with the use of machine learning — a common method
for developing neuroimaging and EEG active paradigms used to assess
residual awareness in behaviorally unresponsive patients. If, for exam-
ple, the learning phase of a linear classifier is biased due to, among
other reasons, neuroimaging or EEG artifacts, the resulting classification
model may inadvertently produce false positive results and undermine
the specificity of the test.Evidently, statistical thresholds may require varying degrees of
conservativeness. Correction methods, such as Family Wise Error,
Bonferroni Correction, or False Discovery Rate reduce significance
thresholds to ensure the highest confidence level for positive find-
ings. Bonferroni correction, for example, divides the standard signif-
icance threshold of p b 0.05 by the number of independent tests. If an
investigation has 20 independent tests, this correction would reduce
the significance threshold to p b 0.0025 (5%/20). Employing these
methods of analysis allows investigators to set the evidentiary bar
high. For linear classifiers, this may produce a highly conservative
classification phase that rejects borderline findings. However, such
correction methods may also increase the burden of proof to such a
degree that true results are erroneously interpreted as false
positives.4. fMRI versus EEG
In fMRI experiments, standard statistical techniques that correct for
multiple comparisons (e.g. Family Wise Error or False Discovery Rate)
reduce the probability of false positives. Moreover, in contrast to
whole-brain analysis, studies that restrict interpretation to regions of in-
terest vastly reduce the quantity of multiple comparisons and subse-
quent need for statistical correction. For these reasons, region of
interest analysis is a standard approach in fMRI active paradigms used
to assess residual awareness in behaviorally unresponsive patients
(Fernández-Espejo and Owen, 2013; Monti et al., 2010; Naci and
Owen, 2013; Owen et al., 2006). The application of alternative analytic
methods, such as independent component analysis (Demertzi et al.,
2014) or multivariate pattern analysis (Bardin et al., 2012), may precip-
itate methodological challenges in need of future critical reflection
(Fins, 2012).
Apart from these statistical details, the fMRImental imagery task de-
sign also reduces the chance of false positives. The probability of a par-
ticipant – patient or healthy volunteer – activating the supplementary
motor area merely by chance, at exactly the right point in the experi-
mental task, sustaining that activity for precise 30-second intervals,
and repeating the process several times, is incalculably low (Owen,
2013). This gives reason to believe that, provided that the task design
is well controlled and implemented faithfully, fMRI active paradigms
rarely produce false positive results.
Estimating the clinical utility of EEG active paradigms, on the other
hand, is currentlymore challenging. Because themost extensive EEG ac-
tive paradigm studies to date have not returned 100% sensitivity ratings
in healthy participants, the probability of false negatives remains a
problem. Notwithstanding this complication, a far greater obstacle is
controlling for movement artifacts. VS/UWS patients, while presumed
to be unaware, may still exhibit bodily movement. Without appropriate
methods for artifact exclusion, even minor electrical activity in a
patient3s facial musculature may bias linear classification and lead to
false positive results.
Two statistical methods for inferring the presence of covert
command following from the output of machine-learning algo-
rithms – binomial distribution and permutation testing – approach
this problem differently (Cruse et al., 2011; Cruse et al., 2013;
Goldfine et al., 2013; Noirhomme et al., 2014). A binomial test is a
parametric method for distributing the probability of positive or
negative findings across discrete, independent tests (Noirhomme
et al., 2014). Importantly, binomial distribution assumes that the an-
alyzed data are acquired from an experimental design that treats
each trial as an independent assay. A permutation test, on the other
hand, is a nonparametric method that estimates the distribution of
the null-hypothesis from the entire data set (Noirhomme et al.,
2014). By randomly permuting individual trials hundreds to thou-
sands of times, this method mitigates the possibility of trial effects
that may inadvertently influence the results of adjacent trials. Unlike
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built into the design of the experiment. However, a large quantity
of data may be required to achieve enough permutations to draw
valid conclusions (Cruse et al., 2014b).
To demonstrate the relevant differences between these statistical
methods, consider a recent dispute over the use of an EEG active para-
digm to detect covert awareness in a cohort of seriously brain-injured
patients. Using an EEG active paradigm and binomial distribution
model, Cruse and colleagues tested for the presence of covert command
following in 12 healthy participants and 16 patients clinically diagnosed
as being in a VS/UWS (Cruse et al., 2011). The experiment was orga-
nized in a pseudorandomized block design, in which each block was
preceded by verbal instructions for toewiggling orfist clenchingmental
imagery. Verbal instructions were followed by a series of 15 beeps, or
trials, with randomly generated inter-stimulus time intervals of
4.5–9.5 s. 25 electrodes over the motor cortices, extending from elec-
trode C3 to C4, were selected for data acquisition. Filtered and artifact
subtracted data were provided to a liner support vector machine
(SVM) classifier in matched block pairs. Cruse and colleagues hypothe-
sized that, if event-related desynchronizations and synchronization
occurred in motor regions in response to motor imagery commands,
it could be inferred that participants were willfully modulating
their brain activity, and were therefore aware. The results of the study
indicated high classification accuracy for both hand and toe mental
imagery in 75% of healthy participants (n = 9) and 19% of VS/UWS
patients (n = 3). Decoding accuracy in the patient sample was be-
tween 61% and 78%, with p-values ranging from p = 0.0015 to p =
3 × 10−8.
Due to concerns over low frequency artifacts permeating across tri-
als and blocks – hypothesized to be due to participant movement –
Goldfine and colleagues reanalyzed a subset of these findings to deter-
mine whether the patient results were false positives (Goldfine et al.,
2013). Unlike Cruse and colleagues3 sequential block-wise pairing,
Goldfine and colleagues compared all possible block pairs during classi-
fication. This approach, it was argued, eliminated the possibility of arti-
fact contamination across blocks, which may be inaccurately classified
as positive findings if the blocks are too close together in time. Reanaly-
sis decreased the classifier accuracy for two of the three patients who
returned positive results in Cruse and colleagues3 original study to
chance — 56% and 59%, respectively. Classification accuracy was also
decreased, though still within the boundaries of significance, for three
healthy participants.
Goldfine and colleagues then carried out a permutation test on all
blocks to calculate significance. It was argued that the block design of
the original study violated the assumptions of the binomial distribution
model (Goldfine et al., 2013). Since low frequency artifacts appearing in
one trial may contaminate the results of adjacent trials, the tests were
not functionally independent as binomial distribution assumes. The p-
values for two patients – those whose classification accuracies were
reduced to chance – were raised above the significance threshold of
p b 0.05. However, the value of one remaining patient still fell within
the boundaries of significance (p = 0.0286) (Goldfine et al., 2013:
supplement).
Finally, to correct for multiple comparisons, Goldfine and colleagues
applied a False Discovery Rate method. “…[W]ithout correction for
multiple comparisons,” they argued, “a classifier is expected to yield
‘positive’ results in a fraction of patients just by chance, and we wanted
to determine whether this phenomenon was a plausible interpretation
of ourfindings” (Goldfine et al., 2013: supplement). After correction, the
p-value for the final patient fell outside the boundaries of statistical
significance. The completed reanalysis suggested that all patients pre-
sumed to generate true positive results in the original study had instead
generated false positives.
In response to these criticisms, Cruse and colleagues argued that
permutation testing did not satisfy statistical standards for drawing
valid conclusions from limited data. Because the significance test wasrestricted to blocks, as opposed to trials, nearly half of the participants
only produced 36 permutations (Cruse et al., 2013: 291). However,
the literature on nonparametric statistics suggests that at least 1000
permutations are necessary for this type of analysis (Maris, 2004;
Maris and Oostenveld, 2007). Cruse and colleagues also noted that the
method proposed byGoldfine and colleagues rendered dramatic chang-
es to the healthy participant data. In the original study, 75% of healthy
participants exhibited high classification accuracy and significant p-
values (Cruse et al., 2011). By contrast, permutation testing and false
discovery rate correction returned significant findings in only 40% of
healthy participant data (2 out of 5). Reflecting on this, Cruse and col-
leagues argued that:
Although there are few known truthswhen attempting to detect co-
vert awareness, the one thing we can assume to know is that when
healthy volunteers are asked to do the imagery tasks described in our
original paper, they are doing them […]. Because [Goldfine and
colleagues3]method fails to detect command following in 60% of healthy
volunteers, it is equally likely to fail to detect command following
(where it exists) in most patients. (Cruse et al., 2013: 291–292).
The reduction of sensitivity resulting frompermutation testing is not
exclusive to the Goldfine–Cruse exchange. In a recent study by
Noirhomme and colleagues (2014), findings derived from an EEG active
paradigm and binomial test on a similar cohort of seriously brain-
injured patients (Lulé et al., 2013) were reanalyzed using permutation
testing to determine the relative benefits of different statistical models.
Of those patients who initially obtained classification accuracies above
chance with a binomial test (n = 3), reanalysis with permutation test-
ing reduced classification accuracies to chance and no statistically sig-
nificant p-values were found. Noirhomme and colleagues concluded
that binomial testing could lead to biased estimations of significance
and potential diagnostic errors. However, unlike Cruse and colleagues3
investigation, the patient data reanalyzed by Noirhomme and col-
leagues was derived from patients clinically diagnosed as minimally
conscious (Noirhomme et al., 2014: 689). This suggests that, at the
very least, the patients were known to be minimally aware prior to
EEG testing. Taken together, these findings suggest that, when using
EEG in combination with machine-learning to detect residual aware-
ness in seriously brain-injured patients, binomial distribution may bias
results toward false positives. However, permutation testing may also
bias results toward false negatives.
To be sure, the goal of rigorous peer review and reanalysis is to de-
rive the most accurate neuroimaging and EEG techniques for assessing
residual covert awareness in seriously brain-injured patients. While a
subset of fMRI active paradigms may be sufficiently refined to estimate
clinical utility, it is evident thatmorework needs to be done on any pro-
tocol that utilizes mental imagery as a proxy for behavioral command
following. Movement artifacts, statistical noise and other confounds
are challenges that both fMRI and EEG active paradigms face. False pos-
itive and false negative errors are germane to all such challenges. Ulti-
mately, neuroimaging techniques with high sensitivity and specificity
are desired. However, finding the right balance between false positives
and false negatives may be the only recourse until a veridical measure-
ment of consciousness is identified (Giacino et al., 2014: 106; Giacino
et al., 2009).5. Inductive risk and diagnostic error
Philosophers of science may describe the challenge of estimating
the clinical utility in this context as a problem of underdetermination.
In its most general form, the underdetermination thesis holds that,
for any two empirically equivalent hypotheses that have the same
class of observation consequences, empirical rationale will not resolve
which hypothesis to accept. Rather, one must appeal to extra-
empirical reasons – that is, pragmatic or normative reasons – for hy-
pothesis adoption (Biddle, 2013; Lauden, 1990; Lauden and Leplin,
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amount to adjudicating between the relative risks and benefits of
accepting a hypothesis on the grounds of its potential social impact.
It is well known that seriously brain-injured patients are already vul-
nerable to high rates of misdiagnosis (Andrews et al., 1996;
Candilieri et al., 2011; Childs et al., 1993; Schnackers et al., 2009).
Thus, choosing among particular experimental methods, which
may be known to bias results toward false positives or false nega-
tives, may compound this diagnostic problem. If error is inevitable,
which type of error should investigators make?
One way to resolve this problem is to appeal to a principle of induc-
tive risk (Douglas, 2000). A principle of inductive risk weighs the rela-
tive value of accepting an underdetermined hypothesis by calculating
the benefits and harms it could generate. This may amount to formulat-
ing explicit acceptance rules that assign value to all possible outcomes
(Hempel, 1965: 92). For example, it may be argued that the evidential
strength for any given hypothesis is, “a function of the importance […]
of making a mistake in accepting or rejecting [it].” (Rudner, 1953: 2;
original italics). This may lead one to conclude that, “How sure we need
to be beforewe accept a hypothesiswill dependupon how serious amistake
[caused by accepting it] would be” (Rudner, 1953: 2; original italics).
With respect to assessing seriously brain-injured patients, what risks
do we take in attributing a false positive or false negative diagnosis?
An answer to this question will depend on the value we place on the
possible outcomes.
In the conclusion of their reanalysis, Goldfine and colleagues implic-
itly gesture toward such an acceptance rule. They state that, “in the
diagnostic setting (e.g., the determination of consciousness, genomic
diagnosis of cancer), classifier failure can misinform clinical decision
making, with major consequences for patients and families” (Goldfine
et al., 2013: 290). Given that Goldfine and colleagues3 reanalysis brought
to light the possibility of false positive results related to binomial test-
ing, we take their conclusion to mean that false positive diagnoses, as
opposed to false negatives, pose the greatest problem in this clinical
context. Indeed, if seriously brain-injured patients are falsely ascribed
awareness as a result of certain analytic methods, decisions that are in-
consistent with the patient3s actual condition may occur. But is it also
possible for equally important consequences to arise if we falsely pre-
sume that a patient is in a VS/UWS when, in fact, she retains some di-
mension of awareness? Building on related work (Jox et al., 2012), we
outline three clinical scenarios where this trade-off between false posi-
tive and false negative diagnoses may be most pronounced in this pa-
tient group (see Table 4).5.1. Disclosure of results to patients3 families
The disclosure of false diagnostic information to families may have
serious implications for clinical decision-making. It is standard practice
for a familymember to serve as a surrogate decisionmaker. If surrogates
are provided information inconsistent with the patient3s actual condi-
tion, clinical decisions may not align with the best interests of patients
and families. A false positive diagnosismay influence a surrogate to pro-
long life support in the hopes that a patientwill recover. Since it is false-
ly believed that the patient is covertly aware, financial and emotional
resources may be misdirected. Conversely, a false negative diagnosis
may cause a family and health care workers to emotionally and finan-
cially withdraw from a patient. Since it is falsely believed that there is
no evidence of awareness, enrolling the patient in rehabilitation or
long-term care facilities may not occur.
Clearly, fMRI and EEG active paradigm findings, whether true or
false, will have some measurable impact on clinical decision making.
Determiningwhether if and how such information is disclosedmaymit-
igate the harms that could arise in conjunction with false positive and
false negative diagnoses (Graham et al., 2014). Disclosure of results
may be framed in various ways. It may be argued that positive results(both true positives and false positives) pose a minimal risk because
the effect of disclosure is negligible. Families coping with serious brain
injurymay already hold deep beliefs about a patient3s preserved aware-
ness. In one study investigating family attitudes, 90% of patients
diagnosed as VS/UWS were thought by family members to retain
some dimension of awareness contrary to their clinical diagnosis
(Tresch et al., 1991). However, in a recentmulti-center study investigat-
ing families3 perceptions of preserved consciousness in brain injured
patients, 76% of participants estimated the same level of consciousness
that diagnostic tests showed (Jox et al., 2015). In the remaining cases,
the investigators reported that consciousness was underestimated.
The difference in these study findings may be explained by the recent
introduction of the minimally conscious state diagnostic category. In-
deed, many of the patients included in Tresch and colleagues3 (1991)
study may have satisfied the diagnostic criteria of the minimally con-
scious state. In either case, these studies suggest that surrogates may
have strong attitudes regarding preserved consciousness in brain in-
jured patients, whichmay be unaltered by fMRI or EEG findings. Further
systematic study of families3 attitudes in response to positive results is
clearly warranted.
The disclosure of negative findings (both true and false negatives)
may bemore ethically problematic. Aside from errors generated by sta-
tistical modeling, other confounds, including a patient3s attention span,
ability to understand instructions, and contingent levels of arousal, may
contribute to false negative findings. Given that surrogates may not un-
derstand the test conditions that produce negative findings – whether
true or false – such results may be framed as “uninformative”, if
disclosed at all. Whether or not their response is appropriate, families
are likely to interpret all information, or lack there of, as diagnostically
salient. Hence, disclosure of false negative results without proper
counseling is palpably dangerous. Ensuring that surrogates understand
the meaning of negative findings should be a central focus of future
research.5.2. Withdrawal of life sustaining therapies
To date, the most extensive research on this patient group has been
in chronic populations (n N 6 months post-injury). It is in these cases
that the problems of estimating clinical utility have emerged. However,
it is likely that neuroimagingmethodswill soon be used in the diagnosis
and prognostication of acutely comatose patients. While the clinical
benefit of these techniques in acute populations has yet to be conclu-
sively demonstrated (but see Norton et al., 2012; Gofton et al., 2009;
and see Young, 2009b for review of outcome after cardiac arrest), it is
possible that fMRI or EEG findings may assist surrogate decisionmakers
in weighing the decision to continue, or withdraw, life-sustaining ther-
apy. Thus false positive and false negative findings may have significant
implications for acutely comatose patients.
Although the desiderata to withdraw life-sustaining therapies
would surely extend beyond fMRI or EEG findings – namely to, among
other factors, etiology, structural neuroimaging, and clinical examina-
tion (Giacino et al., 2014) – the risk remains that contravening evidence
of awareness or favorable prognosis would not be produced if statistical
methods biased results toward false negatives. As noted earlier, families
may also falsely interpret a lack of measured effect as evidence of un-
awareness. Without proper counseling, this may lead to premature
withdrawal of life sustaining therapies during the acute phase of
recovery.
Conversely, imaging techniques that bias results toward false
positives may undermine withdrawal of life sustaining therapies.
Recent research at Canadian trauma centers demonstrates a 32%
mortality rate following serious brain injury with 70% of deaths asso-
ciated with the withdrawal of life sustaining therapies (Turgeon
et al., 2011). Most decisions to withdraw life sustaining therapies oc-
curred very early, with one half of deaths within 72 hours of injury.
Table 4
Potential risks of false positive and false negative diagnoses.
Clinical scenario Diagnostic error Potential outcomes and risks
Disclosure of results False positive Prolonged and unnecessary treatment in the Intensive Care Unit. Unnecessary financial and emotional exhaustion for families.
False negative Potentially undermine family3s belief that patient is aware, causing emotional suffering. Potentially cause families and health
care workers to be less attentive to patient.
Withdrawal of life support False positive Missed “window of opportunity” to withdraw life sustaining therapies.
False negative Premature withdrawal of life sustaining therapies.
Resource allocation False positive Unnecessary allocation of resources to medically futile cases.
False negative Insufficient medical resources allocated to patient.
This list is not intended to be exhaustive. See also Jox et al. (2012) for a complimentary outline of risks.
595A. Peterson et al. / NeuroImage: Clinical 7 (2015) 588–597For surrogates in this situation, there may be a perceived “window of
opportunity” for the withdrawal of care to avoid undesirable patient
outcomes (Kitzinger and Kitzinger, 2013). If acutely comatose pa-
tients are falsely ascribed consciousness or a favorable prognosis,
surrogates may forego the withdrawal of life sustaining therapies
and miss this opportunity.
It may also be argued that false negatives generate a self-fulfilling
prophecy in this research setting. Indeed, if it is already evident that
withdrawal of life sustaining therapies occurs early on, false negative re-
sults may hasten patient death before sufficient evidence pertaining to
long-term outcome is acquired. This may engender methodological
complications for any study investigating the diagnostic and prognostic
benefit of fMRI or EEG in acutely comatose patients. If, on the other
hand, investigators err on the side false positive results, methodological
and ethical concerns regarding the premature withdrawal of life sus-
taining therapies may be avoided. If fMRI or EEG results prompt a closer
examination of the patient3s condition, even if the results are eventually
ruled out as false positives, this “second look” may reveal information
that is both ethically and epistemologically salient. What is clear is
that more research must be done to determine the possibility of draw-
ing accurate diagnostic or prognostic information from fMRI and EEG
in acutely comatose patients. Assuming that this is possible, disclosing
this information with proper counseling may help families navigate
these difficult decisions.5.3. Equitable distribution of medical resources
False positive and false negative diagnoses of seriously brain injured
patients may influence the fair distribution of medical resources.
Patients with serious brain-injuries require highly specialized medical
care in both the intensive care unit and long term care facilities. In a
recent Canadian supreme court case regarding the withdrawal of
life sustaining therapies in a patient clinically diagnosed as being in a
VS/UWS (Cuthbertson v. Rasouli, 2013), the cost of intensive care was
estimated at $3000 per day. In jurisdictions where medical expenses
are subsidized by federal, state, or provincial bodies, these costs may
be transferred to tax payers. Notwithstanding the financial burden of
prolonged treatment, the use of resources for cases perceived to be fu-
tile may be difficult to reconcile with the extant needs of other patients.
Due to these circumstances, seriously brain-injured patients are highly
vulnerable to socio-economic pressures. The reasonable probability of
false positive diagnoses resulting from active paradigms, even with
themost conservative statisticalmodels,may drawcriticism frompolicy
makers at medical and governmental institutions.
On the other hand, false negative diagnoses may have a detrimental
effect on treatment outcome if medical resources are removed from pa-
tients that, in fact, stand a good chance of recovery. It is well known that
after partial recovery from serious brain injury, most patients are trans-
ferred to facilities with suboptimal palliative care (cf. Fins, 2003).While
it remains to be demonstrated empirically, the decrease in intensive in-
teraction that accompanies the transfer to long-term care may be ther-
apeutically detrimental.Problems of just distribution of medical resources will surely arise
when caring for seriously brain-injured patients. The general risks to
the equitable distribution of resources are difficult to quantify. How to
balance potential false positive and false negative diagnoses with the
demands of health care justice will be an important question as this re-
search matures.6. Conclusions
In this article, we have reviewed several fMRI and EEG active para-
digms used to assess residual covert awareness in seriously brain-
injured patients. We anticipate that, given further work, these tech-
niques will continue to draw attention to ambiguities in prognosis and
diagnosis of these patients and further refine our understanding of
their conditions. We have also attempted to highlight the unique meth-
odological puzzles that emerge in this research setting. These puzzles,
we believe, hinder efforts to provide an accurate calculation of clinical
utility. Adjudicating between particular methods of analysis, which, in
turn, may bias results toward false positives or false negatives, remains
one of themost challenging obstacles in this research setting. In the face
of uncertainty, we suggest that the relative risks engendered by false
positive or false negative diagnoses may play a role in guiding future
research.
To be sure, like many research programs investigating the use of ac-
tive paradigms for assessment of serious brain-injury (e.g. Giacino et al.,
2014; Stender et al., 2014), we do not currently advocate diagnosis or
prognostication based exclusively on fMRI, EEG, or any other form of
neuroimaging. Nor do we suggest that the evaluation of a technique3s
clinical utility be completely handed over to risk assessment. When in
doubt, the most methodologically sound and ethically responsible way
to determine if a patient is truly covertly awaremay be to appeal to a va-
riety of sources of evidence (Cruse et al., 2014b; Forgacs et al., 2014;
Giacino et al., 2014; Gibson et al., 2014). This approachmay incorporate
findings from validated clinical examinations, as well as alternative
structural and functional techniques, to evaluate the total body of evi-
dence regarding a patient3s condition. However, it must also be ac-
knowledged that some patients, whose entire clinical presentation is
consistent with the VS/UWS, may nevertheless demonstrate awareness
with the use of validated neuroimaging or EEG techniques. An interim
solution to this problem may be to develop a rigorous model-based di-
agnostic decision-tree that guides physicians and researchers through
the relative risks of diagnostic error. Future work on such a decision-
tree would greatly benefit research programs looking to integrate func-
tional neuroimaging into standard diagnostic protocols (Coleman et al.,
2009; Laureys et al., 2004; Owen, 2013).
If themethodological obstacles inherent to fMRI and EEG active par-
adigms make diagnostic errors difficult to avoid, we ask: what type of
error is best to make? Interest in this problem, particularly in relation
to the stipulation of statistical thresholds, is now an emerging topic of
discussion in the disorders of consciousness literature. We recommend
a sustained discussion of this problem from both conceptual and
empirical perspectives. In some cases, this may amount to reanalyzing
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(Goldfine et al., 2013; Noirhomme et al., 2014). In others, investigators
may choose to apply several different correction methods to one data
set in order to demonstrate how these alter study findings (Cruse
et al., 2014a). Finally, some investigators may choose to apply two or
more neuroimaging methods to a patient sample for comparison
(Forgacs et al., 2014; Gibson et al., 2014; Stender et al., 2014). In each in-
stance, careful reflection on this problemwill strengthen the case for in-
cluding neuroimaging and EEG in routine diagnostic and prognostic
protocols. This, we believe, will ultimately benefit the long-term well-
being of seriously brain-injured patients and their families.Acknowledgments
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